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THE INTERPLAY OF INSTITUTIONS 
Linkages between Enacting and Implementing Competition Law in India 
 
Amber Darr 
Abstract  
This paper explores the impact of the diffusion strategy adopted by India for 
acquiring its competition law on the manner in which the competition law has 
and is being implemented in the country. It argues that the diffusion strategy 
has a direct as well as in indirect impact on the implementation of the 
competition law. The direct impact of the diffusion strategy derives from the 
manner in which the strategy shapes the content of the law particularly the 
provisions relating to the structure, mandate and composition of the 
implementing institutions created by the law. This impact direct affects the 
decision making of the implementing institutions and thereby directly charts 
the implementation trajectory of the law. The indirect impact derives from the 
impact of the strategy on the legitimacy of the law. The competition law may 
be challenged before general courts in India on grounds of legitimacy and the 
decisions of these courts indirectly impact the manner in and direction along 
which the law is implemented.  
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I.  Introduction  
In early 2003, after nearly four years of deliberations, India enacted the 
Competition Act 2002 and simultaneously repealed the anti-monopoly law that 
had been in force in the country for more than thirty years. 1 In doing so, India 
not only became the first country in the South Asian region to acquire a 
competition law that was in line with international best practices but also 
joined the ranks of more than one hundred countries throughout the world that 
had adopted similar laws in recent years. 2  
 
In drafting this law, India had consulted several foreign models while at the 
same time taking care to ensure that the competition principles it proposed to 
adopt for the Indian context were compatible with the country’s stage of 
economic development and its economic goals. Consequently, whilst the 
competition law, both as it was first enacted in 2002 and later amended in 
2007, shared commonalities with a number of competition regimes throughout 
the world, it also differed in material respects from these models and, more 
importantly for the purposes of this paper, followed an implementation 
trajectory unique to the Indian context. In this paper, I propose that these 
differences in the substance and implementation trajectory of the Indian 
competition law are attributable, in large part, to the diffusion strategy adopted 
by India for acquiring its competition law.  
 
I argue that India’s diffusion strategy for acquiring its competition law has 
shaped the subsequent implementation trajectory of the law in the country in 
one of two ways: First, by shaping the substance of competition law, in 
particular the provisions relating to the structure, mandate and composition3 of 
the institutions of competition implementation4 (‘the Implementing Institutions’) 
and thereby, their decisions. I refer to this as the ‘direct impact’. And second, 
by influencing the legitimacy of the competition law in the country and thereby 
creating grounds for challenging the law itself as well as the actions, possibly 
even the existence, of the Implementing Institutions. I refer to this as the 
‘indirect impact’.  
 
I evaluate the direct impact of diffusion strategy on the implementation 
trajectory of competition law in India by an analysis of the decisions of the 
                                                 
1
 I refer to the Indian Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969. 
2
 The term “South Asian” refers to member countries of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Co-operation (SAARC), established on 8th December 1985, namely, Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  Of the initial 7 SAARC 
countries (Afghanistan had joined only in 2007), India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka were the only 
countries that had a history of laws for the regulation of competition prior to the adoption of 
modern competition laws. In 2003, Sri Lanka enacted the Consumer Affairs Authority Act to 
safeguard consumers and regulate competition in its markets followed in 2007 by Pakistan 
when it promulgated a Competition Ordinance for similar purposes. 
3
 The term ‘composition’ as used throughout this paper refers to the requisite qualifications of 
natural persons who form the Implementing Institutions as well as the mechanism provided in 
the competition law for their appointment and removal.  
4
 i.e. the Commission which is the first tier implementing institution, the Competition Appellate 
Tribunal (COMPAT), the second tier implementing institution and the Supreme Court in its 
competition appellate jurisdiction, the third and final tier implementing institution.  
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Implementing Institutions and an evaluation of the extent to which these are 
determined by the structure, mandate and composition of the Implementing 
Institutions as shaped by the country’s diffusion strategy. For assessing the 
indirect impact I examine the number and nature of challenges filed against 
the competition law before the implementing authorities pre-existing in India 
(‘the General Courts’) 5  and the response of the General Courts to these 
challenges.  
 
 
II.  India’s Diffusion Strategy for Acquiring its Competition Law 
 
In order to understand the diffusion strategy employed by India to acquire its 
competition law it is first necessary to identify the possible strategies available 
to it in this regard. These include: 
 
(a) Emulation which, in the sense I refer to it in this paper, is 
synonymous with lesson-drawing, cost-saving and problem solving. 
In the typology presented by Morin and Gold 6  the process of 
emulation is based on impressions of the foreign model and of the 
prestige of the country in which it may have originated. It generates 
a ‘cost-saving’ transplant;7  
 
(b) Regulatory competition takes place when lawmakers adopt foreign 
rules, whether or not they are effective in addressing domestic 
issues, in order to better position their country in a competitive 
world.8 This strategy yields a ‘legitimacy-generating transplant’; 9  
 
(c) Socialization is a process directed towards the internalization of the 
principles, beliefs and norms of a foreign community. A state is 
more likely to adopt a foreign rule if it is persuaded of its 
appropriateness ie if the legal rule in question resonates with 
established social norms and fits with the collective identity of the 
adopter country.10 Socialization implies a deeper understanding and 
penetration of the ideas borrowed from the foreign country than 
emulation. The process leads to an ‘entrepreneurial transplant’;11  
 
                                                 
5
 These include the High Courts and the Supreme Court sitting in their inherent writ 
jurisdiction.  
6
 Jean-Frédéric Morin and Richard E Gold, ‘An Integrated Model of Legal Transplantation: 
The Diffusion of Intellectual Property Law in Developing Countries’ [2015] International 
studies quarterly 
<http://www.researchgate.net/publication/259203702_An_Integrated_Model_of_Legal_Trans
plantation_The_Diffusion_of_Intellectual_Property_Law_in_Developing_Countries_Draft_vers
ion/file/9c96052a6e5c47774b.pdf> accessed 8 March 2014. 
7
 Jonathan M Miller, ‘A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and 
Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process’ (2003) 51 The American journal of 
comparative law : a quarterly The American Journal of Comparative Law 839. 
8
 Morin & Gold n. 6. 
9
 Miller n. 7. 
10
 Morin & Gold n. 6. 
11
 Miller n. 7. 
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(d) Contractualization occurs when states bargain with one another (or, 
by extension, with multilateral agencies) in relation to a legal rule 
and those negotiations usually include trade-offs linking two or more 
issue areas which is then formalized by a bilateral or international 
treaty or contract. It is important to bear in mind, however, that 
contracting parties do not necessarily negotiate as equals and their 
contractual agreement does not always result in balanced 
outcomes. 12  Contractualization yields an ‘externally dictated 
transplant’;13 and 
 
(e) Coercion which occurs when a state (or a multilateral agency) 
promotes its rules through the use of material power, whether 
military or economic.14 As in the case of contractualization, coercion 
yields an ‘externally dictated transplant’.15  
 
The literature further collectively refers to strategies (a) to (c) as strategies of 
‘horizontal’ diffusion and classifies strategies (d) and (e) as ‘vertical 
diffusion’.16 
 
Since its creation as an independent state in 1947, India has had an unbroken 
tradition of democracy and has created, nurtured and maintained this tradition 
with the help of strong institutions. 17  These institutions were evidently at work 
at the time and the manner in which India acquired its competition law. They 
defined and shaped India’s diffusion strategy, which in turn determined the 
substance of the competition law, particularly the provisions relating to the 
structure, mandate and composition of the Implementing Institutions, as well 
as its legitimacy. In the discussion that follows, I examine the diffusion 
strategy adopted by India by analyzing the interplay of institutions at each 
stage of diffusion.  
 
The Stages of Diffusion of Competition Law in India 
 
(a)   India decides to review its anti-monopoly regime  
In 1999, when the Indian government decided to take up the question of 
whether it should simply amend its anti-monopoly law or adopt a new 
competition law, it had the legal authority as well as the experience of setting 
up committees for the purposes of law reform. Further, the government had a 
strong tradition of re-evaluating its anti-monopoly legislation and had in place 
the necessary institutional framework within which to undertake the 
exercise. 18  Establishing a nine-member committee (‘the Raghavan 
                                                 
12
 Morin & Gold n. 6 
13
 Miller n.7. 
14
 Morin & Gold n. 6. 
15
 Miller n. 7. 
16
 Morin & Gold n. 6. 
17
The term ‘institutions’ used throughout this paper includes formal organizations as well as 
any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction whether formal 
or informal, created or evolved over time. (Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional 
Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press 1990).  
18
 The Indian Monopolies Act was enacted following the recommendations of the Monopoly 
Inquiry Committee, the Mahalonobis Committee Report 1964 (set up to examine the 
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Committee’ or ‘the Committee’) comprising almost entirely of indigenous 
experts inter alia from business, government and legal sectors, was in 
accordance with this norm. The Indian government provided the Committee 
necessary powers to hold deliberations amongst its members as well as to 
consult with stakeholders. It also allowed the Committee sufficient time to 
prepare its report and to return it to the government for further action.  
 
(b)  India identifies parameters of the proposed competition law 
In the course of its deliberations, the Raghavan Committee engaged with and 
recorded evidence from representatives of chambers of industries and 
commerce, professional institutes, consumer organizations, experts, 
academics and government officials. It also consulted competition laws of 
nearly eighty countries as well as competition reports and texts authored by 
Indian and international competition officials and scholars. On the basis of its 
discussions, the Raghavan Committee came to the conclusion that a mere 
amendment of India’s anti-monopoly legislation would not allow the country to 
meet its long term domestic or international economic interests or aims, and 
that only a modern competition law drafted along the lines of international best 
practices would suffice in this regard.19  
 
Further, the Committee was convinced of the need for a specialized 
competition implementing authority because it did not believe the judiciary to 
have the experience necessary for dealing with market problems. The 
Committee suggested that this authority be structured as an administrative 
and adjudicatory body divided into separate wings for its investigative, 
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, with adequate powers for advocacy 
of competition policy, adjudication and effective implementation of its 
decisions. It further recommended that the authority have the mandate to 
check ‘cartelization, price-fixing and other abuses of market power’. Further, 
although it included merger control in the authority’s list of activities, it 
cautioned that given India’s recent transition from a protected to a liberalized 
economy ‘premature implementation of Competition Law in this area [merger 
control]’ should be avoided as it ‘could act as a disincentive for necessary 
mergers’.  
 
In recommending the composition of the proposed authority, the Committee 
suggested that it be made autonomous and free from political influence. To 
this end, it proposed that the authority comprise eminent and erudite persons 
of integrity from the fields of judiciary, economics, law, international trade, 
commerce, industry, accountancy, public affairs and administration. Further, it 
emphasized the importance of instituting a transparent ‘Collegium Selection 
Process’ for appointing such persons, which would be binding on the 
                                                                                                                                            
distribution and levels of income in the country and the Hazari Committee Report 1965 (set up 
to study industrial licensing procedure). In 1984, India had amended the Indian Monopolies 
Act in light of the Sachar Committee Report. It 1991 it further amended the law at the 
recommendation of the government.  
19
 SV. Raghavan, ‘Report of High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law’ (2000) 
<http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/asia/India/Report_of_High_Level_Committee
_on_Competition_Policy_Law_SVS_Raghavan_Committee29102007.pdf> accessed 6 March 
2014. 
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government. It also recommended that the government only be able to 
remove persons appointed to the authority with the concurrence of the 
Supreme Court.  
 
(c)   India enacts and amends its Competition Law 
In early 2003, India enacted its competition law in accordance with the 
procedure prescribed in the Constitution. The government introduced a bill on 
the proposed law in the Parliament, outlining the objects and reasons for its 
enactment. The Parliament remitted the bill to its Standing Committee for 
detailed scrutiny. The Standing Committee in turn met with representatives of 
financial institutions, chambers of industry and commerce, consumer 
organizations, professional institutes, experts, academics and relevant 
ministries of the government and presented its report to the Parliament. In 
December 2002, the Parliament, after considering the recommendations of 
the Standing Committee and effecting some amendments thereto, passed the 
competition law and submitted it to the President for his assent.  
 
However, even before the competition law had become fully operational, writ 
petitions were filed inter alia before the Supreme Court on the grounds that 
certain provisions of the law were contrary to the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers. 20  Whilst hearing the petitions filed before it, the 
Supreme Court observed that ‘it might be appropriate for the government to 
consider the creation of two separate bodies, one with expertise for advisory 
and regulatory functions and the other for adjudicatory functions based on the 
doctrine of separation of powers recognized by the Constitution’. 21  The 
Supreme Court dismissed the petitions in early 2005 after the government 
had given it necessary assurances that it would amend the law in accordance 
with the recommendations of the Supreme Court.  
 
On 9th March 2006, acting on the assurances given by it to the Supreme 
Court, the government introduced a competition amendment bill in Parliament 
in terms of which it introduced inter alia the concept of an independent 
Competition Appellate Tribunal (‘COMPAT’). The Parliament once again 
referred the bill for examination to the relevant Standing Committee, which in 
its report suggested certain changes to the government draft. On 9th August 
2007, the government re-submitted the competition amendment bill to the 
Parliament and on 24th September 2007 the Parliament enacted the 
government draft as the Competition (Amendment) Act 2007.  
 
 
Identifying the Indian Diffusion Strategy 
 
The fact that in the course of its deliberations, the Raghavan Committee 
consulted a number of foreign texts and laws of other countries sporting 
competition regimes, suggests a certain element of emulation in its approach 
whilst the pressure felt by the Raghavan Committee due to the ongoing WTO 
                                                 
20
 Brahm Dutt v. Union of India (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 431. 
21
 Statement of Object and Reasons appended to the Indian Competition (Amendment) Act 
2007. 
 7 
 
negotiations suggests that India was at least partially acting out of the need 
for regulatory competition. It is important to note, however, that throughout the 
exercise of formulating a competition law suitable for India, the Committee 
consulted extensively with local stakeholders in a determined effort to tailor 
the foreign models to suit India’s unique needs. Also, in doing so, it acted 
without any apparent technical assistance from any other country or 
multilateral agency. This suggests not only an absence of contractualization 
or coercion but in fact a high degree of socialization. The latter being made 
possible, in large part, by the country’s strong democratic traditions and 
institutions which played an active role in the steps leading up to the 
enactment of the competition law. The Indian Supreme Court’s review of the 
competition law almost immediately after its enactment and the subsequent 
amendment of the law at the recommendation of the Supreme Court, by yet 
another act of Parliament, only enhanced the degree of socialization. Both 
actions enabled the legal community and the superior judiciary to become 
acquainted with the substance and structure of competition law and increased 
the awareness, if not understanding, of Parliamentarians and stakeholders of 
competition related issues.  
 
How the Indian Diffusion Strategy Shaped the Commission 
 
A review of discussions at successive stages of the process adopted by India 
for the diffusion of competition law suggests that the mandate of the 
Commission as provided in the law when it was finally enacted was 
substantially the same as the Raghavan Committee had first suggested it. 
This observation further suggests that in acquiring the provisions related to 
the mandate of the Commission, India pre-dominantly employed the diffusion 
strategies of emulation and regulatory competition. The rationale for this 
choice is likely to be twofold: Firstly, the mandate of the Commission, more 
than its structure and composition, is firmly embedded in universally 
recognized set of competition principles. Secondly, India needed to convince 
its lawmakers that the competition principles advocated by it for adoption in 
the Indian context were derived from prestigious sources and, and would, 
therefore, have the requisite authority in the country. However, the fact that 
India arrived at the mandate of the Commission only after extensive 
consultations with stakeholders and also developed an India specific 
epistemology related to these competition principles reflects the presence of a 
significant degree of socialization.  
 
Similarly, the final structure of the Commission and especially the manner in 
which India arrived at it, also suggests that socialization was India’s dominant 
diffusion strategy. The structure of the Commission evolved successively as 
different institutions, including but not limited to the Committee, the 
Parliament, the Standing Committee and the Supreme Court, engaged with it 
and put forward their recommendations in this regard. These institutions also 
played a similar role in determining the composition of the Commission—
particularly the manner in which the members of the Commission and 
COMPAT may be appointed and removed from office. Composition of the 
Implementing Institutions, may, therefore, also be deemed to be a product of 
socialization.  
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It is important to note, however, that whilst the strategy of socialization 
allowed for greater interaction between institutions, the adoption of the 
strategy itself was likely made possible by the fact that India had strong and 
sustained democratic tradition and institutions.22 Each of the institutions that 
interacted at successive stages of the diffusion process and shaped to varying 
degrees, the structure, mandate and composition of the Commission, 
represented an aspect of democratic traditions and institutions pre-existing in 
the country. The strategy also allowed for a relatively transparent debate even 
on potentially sensitive issues such as the inability of the General Courts to 
deal with complex competition matters and, therefore, the need to limit their 
jurisdiction in this regard and to guard against the government propensity to 
appoint bureaucrats to positions, which should properly be occupied by 
experts.  
 
The importance of such an exercise becomes more evident when compared 
with the fact that it was almost absent in Pakistan, which had adopted a 
broadly similar competition law almost contemporaneously with India. 
Although Pakistan had adopted a largely similar competition law almost 
concurrently with India it had done so predominantly through the vertical 
diffusion strategies of contractualization and coercion and without extensive 
debates with local stakeholders. 23  These strategies had allowed certain 
patterns of conduct embedded in the Pakistani context to seep into the 
competition law without explicit discussion and thereby affect not only the 
structure, mandate and composition of the Pakistani implementing authorities 
but also the legitimacy of the Pakistani competition law in the eyes of the 
Pakistani public and perhaps also the Pakistani judiciary.24   
 
 
III.  The Operation of the Commission and the Direct Impact  
 
An Overview 
 
The website of the Indian Commission reports the number of different orders it 
has passed in the years since it was established and became operational. 
Although the Commission was somewhat slow in starting to implement the 
competition law (it only became fully operational in 2010, three years after the 
2007 amendment act was passed) it grew progressively more active in each 
successive year of its operations, except for 2013 when there appears to have 
been a minor dip in the number of orders passed by the Commission.  
 
                                                 
22
 Katerina Linos, ‘A Theory of Diffusion Through Democratic Mechanisms’.  
23
 The Pakistani Competition Ordinance was first promulgated in October 2007 and has been 
part of the Pakistani legal system since then in one form or another. Unlike India, however, 
Pakistan had acquired its competition largely at the behest and with the assistance of the 
World Bank.   
24  
I refer in particular to the mechanism for appointing and removing members of the 
Commission. The Raghavan Committee recognized the implicit patterns in India and sought 
to guard against them, whilst the World Bank team leading the initiative in Pakistan allowed 
the pre-existing patterns of appointment and removal to seep through without much attention 
to likely impact on the autonomy of the Commission.  
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The significance of the progress of the Indian Commission is thrown into 
greater relief when compared with the performance of the Pakistani 
Commission over the same period, (which, as I have earlier noted, was 
brought into existence predominantly through the diffusion strategy of 
contractualization and coercion). In the figure below, I compare number of 
cases pertaining to abuse of dominance and anti-competitive agreements 
decided by the Indian and Pakistani Commissions in each year of their 
existence. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of number of decisions of the Indian and 
Pakistan Commissions in cases of abuse of dominant position and 
anti-competitive agreements  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Features of the decisions: Reliance on Domestic and Foreign Case Law 
 
A closer examination of the decisions of the Indian Commission in cases of 
abuse of dominant position and anti-competitive agreements further reveals 
that in the period 2011-2014, the Commission relied upon case law, whether 
domestic or foreign, in twenty-four out of the fifty-three cases that it decided. 
The cases it relied upon and cited, ranged from those of the Commission itself 
to those of the erstwhile Monopoly Control Authority, the Indian High Courts 
and Supreme Court as well as foreign competition authorities, most notably 
those of the European Union and the United States (including the US 
Supreme Court). In 2011 and 2012, the Commission relied on diverse 
domestic and foreign resources in the majority of its cases. In 2013, however, 
the Commission cited case law in only six out of fifteen cases it decided and 
even in these it relied more on domestic rather than on foreign cases, 
referring only to one EU decision in one matter that it decided. In 2014, the 
Commission relied upon case law in only eight out of its eighteen judgments, 
0
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once again preferring domestic to foreign cases.25 Interestingly, the cases in 
which the Commission relied on judgments, whether domestic or foreign, are 
neither clustered in any particular sector or area of competition, nor can the 
citations be explained on the basis that the Commission was tackling a 
particular sector for the first time.  
 
Once again the reliance of the Indian Commission on case law in arriving at 
its decisions, particularly that of foreign jurisdictions, is placed into perspective 
when compared with that of the extent of reliance of case law on the part of 
the Pakistani Commission in the same period. The following table compares, 
for each year of their existence, the number of cases in which the Indian and 
Pakistani Commissions relied on domestic and foreign case law, expressing 
these as percentages of total number of cases decided by the two 
Commissions in each year. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of reliance on domestic and foreign judgments 
expressed as percentages26 
 
Year India Pakistan 
Total 
Number 
of 
Cases 
in 
which 
case 
law 
cited  
Domestic 
 Case Law  
(% of total) 
Foreign  
Case 
Law 
(% of 
total)  
Total 
Cases 
in 
which 
case 
law 
cited 
 
Domestic 
 Case Law 
(% of total) 
Foreign  
Case 
Law 
(% of 
total) 
2008    3 33.3 100.0 
2009    7 57.1 71.4 
2010    6 33.3 100.0 
2011 4 50.0 75.0 6 16.6 100.0 
2012 5 80.0 20.0 2 50.0 100.0 
2013 6 50.0 16.6 3 66.6 100.0 
2014 8 62.5 25.0    
 
The differential in the respective reliance of the Indian and Pakistani 
Commission on case law is sufficiently significant to suggest that the 
explanation for it may lie in something other than the possible differences in 
the complexity of cases brought before the two Commissions. I argue that as 
                                                 
25
 In addition to the foreign judgments, in a few cases the Commission also relied upon 
reports of the OECD, Conferences held in the EU and Competition authorities of certain other 
countries. However, this trend also declined in each successive year of the Commission’s 
operations. 
26
 These percentages are intended to be approximate rather than accurate. Also, these 
percentages do not add up to 100 due to the fact that on a number of occasions the 
Commission cited domestic and foreign case law in a single judgment. The blank spaces in 
these tables indicate the years in which the Commission(s) did not decide any cases. 
Nevertheless, the citation trend I intend to demonstrate is evident even allowing for a slight 
margin of error.  
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the Indian Commission evolved over time, it grew more comfortable in its 
enforcement function and, therefore, decreased its reliance on case law in 
arriving at its decisions. The Pakistani Commission, however, continued to 
rely on judgments at a steady pace suggesting thereby that such reliance was 
more a question of strategy and preference rather than legal necessity. It is 
further interesting to note that even when it did rely on case law, the Indian 
Commission cited domestic judgments, at a fairly constant, if not escalating 
pace and preferred its own decisions to any other single category of decisions 
that it cited. 27  More often, however, the Indian Commission relied on its 
common competition sense rather than on legal precedents, suggesting 
thereby that it viewed itself primarily as a regulatory rather than judicial 
body.28  
 
 
 
 
Relating Operation of the Commission to Diffusion Strategy: The Direct 
Impact 
 
The diffusion strategy employed by India is not only an important factor in 
understanding the manner in which the Commission operated but also its 
initial inertia. India’s strategy of socialization made it incumbent upon it to take 
along a host of institutions, which is likely to have rendered it more difficult for 
the government to set up and operationalize the Commission. However, this 
very strategy allowed the Commission, once it had become operational, to 
progress with the explicit approval and knowledge of the Parliament, the 
government and the judiciary. The Indian Commission not only stood on sure 
constitutional ground but also did not encounter operational obstacles due to 
any subsequent changes in the elected government or, had it been set up at 
the behest of a multilateral agency, from the withdrawal of the agency’s 
support. This is again particularly evident in comparison to Pakistan: the 
Pakistani strategy of contractualization and coercion allowed it to act 
decisively in setting up and operationalizing its Commission. However, the 
operation of the Pakistani Commission was subsequently hampered due to 
interference from the institutions that had not been consulted in the initial 
stages,29 and possibly also due to a change in priorities at the World Bank.30  
 
The strategy of socialization and the manner in which it impacted the structure 
and composition of the Indian Commission, also helps explain the 
Commission’s decreasing reliance on case law in general and foreign 
precedents in particular in arriving at its decisions. Further, the Indian 
                                                 
27
 Although this may partly be due to the fact that several cases taken up by the Commission 
were directly connected with, if not emanating from, its earlier decisions, it also displays a 
growing confidence in its decision-making. 
28
 These are preliminary observations and a closer examination of the data is necessary to 
arrive at more nuanced conclusions in this regard.  
29
 The superior judiciary suspended the competition law on constitutional grounds, the 
Parliament was slow to pass formally enact the competition law and the new government 
itself reluctant to appoint members and grant funds to the Commission.  
30
 The World Bank had led and partly funded the initiative of drafting the Pakistani competition 
law. 
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Commission’s self-definition as a regulatory rather than judicial body being an 
outcome of the interaction between the government, the Supreme Court and 
the Parliament in the wake of the writ petition filed before the Supreme Court, 
is also firmly rooted in socialization. The fact that the Indian Commission was 
established and became operational only after extensive interaction between 
multiple institutions over a considerable period of time, allowed for the growth 
of a knowledge base and a degree of competence with respect to competition 
principles. This in turn gave the actors engaged with the Indian Commission 
the confidence to decide cases without necessarily referring to case law.31 It is 
also highly likely that it was this very confidence that allowed the Commission 
to let go of the need for emulation and regulatory competition in implementing 
the competition law, even though it had engaged both these strategies in 
devising its mandate at the time of adoption.  
 
 
IV.  Intervention from the General Courts and the Indirect 
Impact  
 
Interconnections between General Courts and Implementing Institutions 
 
If implementing the competition law was only in the domain of the 
Implementing Institutions, the implementation trajectory of the law, even if 
slow and punctuated, would remain relatively linear: a party to a decision of 
the Commission would either comply with it or appeal it before the COMPAT. 
Similarly, a party to a decision of the COMPAT could either comply with it or 
appeal it before the Supreme Court sitting in its competition appellate 
jurisdiction as conferred upon it by the competition law. In actual fact, 
however, the implementation trajectory of competition law in India may 
potentially veer away from this linear path. This is made possible due to the 
fact that under the Indian Constitution, the General Courts have the inherent 
jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions that may challenge, on constitutional 
grounds, the decisions, authority, and even the very existence of the 
Commission. The decisions the General Courts in respect of these challenges 
have the potential of re-directing or disrupting the operation of the 
Commission, if not completely nullifying its impact, and thereby re-drawing the 
implementation trajectory of competition law in the country. In order to 
understand the manner in which the General Courts may interfere with the 
operations of the Commission, it is necessary to understand the 
interconnections between the Implementing Institutions and the General 
Courts.  
 
Figure 2: Interconnections between the Implementing Institutions and 
General Courts in India 
  
 
Competition 
Commissions 
                                                 
31
 Although beyond the scope of this paper, the high number of dissenting opinions recorded 
in the Commission’s decisions are a further example of such confidence.  
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Legitimacy and its Links with India’s Diffusion Strategy 
 
Challenges against the competition law or the Commission, its actions and 
decisions (or the COMPAT as the case may be) that may be brought before 
the General Courts are likely to be challenges to the legitimacy of the law or 
the Commission, its actions and decisions. Therefore, in order to evaluate 
whether there is a link between India’s diffusion strategy and the nature and 
extent of interventions on the part of the General Courts, it is important to 
understand the manner in and extent to which the country’s diffusion strategy 
impacts the ‘legitimacy’ of the competition law and, by extension, of the 
Implementing Institutions it creates.  
 
The concept of ‘legitimacy’ derives from political philosophy, political science 
and sociology and is defined as ‘the belief that a rule, institution or the leader 
has the right to govern.’32 It is essentially a subjective concept. The literature 
suggests that in order for a people to believe that a law is legitimate, it must, 
at the very least, be believed to have legality. Legality lends authority to the 
law, which adds to the belief of its legitimacy. However, a law may only be 
considered fully legitimate, if in addition to legality and authority, it fulfills an 
objective standard of justice and morality.  
 
An assessment of the actual or perceived legitimacy of the competition law in 
India is beyond the scope of this paper. I, therefore, limit myself to identifying 
the existence of possible sources of different aspects of legitimacy in a 
country and consider an evidence of the existence of one or more of these 
sources to be an evidence of the existence of the aspect of legitimacy that 
may be created through these sources.  Further, in view of the fact that 
                                                 
32
 The concepts of legality and authority are themselves closely linked in that legality implies 
that an action has been taken (or in this case, a law has been enacted) in accordance with 
the law of the country, which in turn lends it authority within the national context.  
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challenges against the competition law that may be brought before the 
General Courts are likely to be on the basis of two aspects of legitimacy, the 
legality or authority of the law, rather than on its adherence to an objective 
standard of either morality or justice, I only focus on identifying the possible 
sources of the former two aspects of legitimacy.  
 
In order to understand the sources of legality and authority it is important to 
understand the process through which a law may attain the perception of 
having these attributes of legitimacy. In terms of the literature, a people may 
believe that a law has legality if (a) they trust that the substance of the law is 
in accordance with the law (‘lawfulness’); (b) they believe that the law has 
been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed (‘procedure’), and (c) 
they have consented to the law (‘consent’). Whilst belief in the legality of the 
law confers a degree of authority upon it, authority may also be derived from 
two additional sources (a) people have faith in a particular political or social 
order, because it has been there for a long time (‘tradition’), and (b) they have 
faith in the rulers (‘charisma’).33 It may, therefore, be argued in the case of 
competition law in India that it is likely to be deemed to have legality if its 
substance and the procedure through which it is enacted, is in accordance 
with the Indian Constitution and also that the procedure for enacting the law is 
based on the consent of the electorate ie is democratic. Further, the law is 
likely to be deemed to have the necessary authority if there is a strong 
tradition that laws (particularly those substantively similar to the competition 
law) will be enacted in the same manner as the competition law was enacted 
and also if the Indian electorate has faith in its representatives.34   
 
Applying this understanding of sources of legality and authority to the Indian 
situation, it may be observed that India’s primary diffusion strategy of 
socialization has substantially contributed to the legitimacy of the competition 
law. An analysis of the strategy suggests that the competition law may be 
deemed to have legality due to lawfulness and procedure by having been 
enacted in accordance with the principles of policy and legislative procedures 
prescribed in the Constitution. The strategy of socialization further suggests 
that the electorate had participated in the enactment of the competition law 
and the law may, therefore, be deemed to have the consent of the electorate 
both at the time of its initial enactment and subsequent amendment.35 The 
existence of authority of the law may be inferred from the Indian tradition of 
enacting laws through a similar process (for the present purposes this is 
particularly evident in India’s debates and reform of the monopoly control law) 
and the general faith of the Indian public in the elected government. The 
                                                 
33
 The literature cites an evaluation of the ‘benefit’ of the law as a further source of legitimacy, 
however, I do not consider it here, as it does not neatly fit into the categories of either legality 
or authority.  
34
 Once again, an assessment of the actual faith of the Indian electorate in their 
representatives is beyond the scope of this paper. For the present purposes I assume the 
existence of faith on the basis of tradition, which is more easily observed in a society.  
35
 This argument may be stretched to state that even the voters have indirectly consented to 
the enactment of this law because their representatives would have likely taken the matter to 
them in the course of elections. However, this aspect of the argument whilst theoretically 
sound would require further investigation on election manifestos which is beyond the scope of 
the present discussion.  
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strategy of socialization had allowed for both of these sources to remain 
constant in the enactment of the competition law.36  
 
General Courts Response to Competition Law Challenges: The Indirect 
Impact 
 
Over the years, a number of entities against which the Indian Commission 
had either initiated investigations or which it had sanctioned for engaging in 
anti-competitive practices or abusing their dominant position, have invoked 
the inherent constitutional jurisdiction of the General Courts to challenge 
these actions, operations and decisions of the Commission. I cite the following 
cases by way of example of the nature of these challenges and the attitude 
adopted by the General Courts in response thereto:  
 
(a) Kingfisher Airlines Limited v. Competition Commissions of India and 
others.37 
Kingfisher had challenged before the High Court, the investigation into 
its affairs ordered by the Commission citing as a ground the 
Commission’s lack of jurisdiction. The High Court dismissed the petition 
and allowed the Commission to proceed with the investigation.  
 
(b) Amir Khan Productions (Pvt.) Limited v. Union of India.38  
Amir Khan Productions (Pvt.) Limited had challenged the show cause 
notice issued by the Commission on the ground that it was tantamount to 
the Commission pre-judging and prejudicing the case against it. 
However, the High Court held that the Commission had the jurisdiction to 
form a preliminary view of the case at the time of issuing a show cause 
notice and doing so was not tantamount to pre-judging or prejudicing the 
case.  
 
(c) Interglobal Aviation Limited v. Secretary Competition Commission of 
India.39 
In this case Interglobal had challenged the powers of the Commission to 
assume jurisdiction in cases, which had been initiated by the Monopoly 
Control Authority. The High Court had held that the Commission had 
jurisdiction in all matters that had previously been pending before its 
predecessor Monopoly Control Authority. 
 
(d) Gujarat Guardian Limited v. Competition Commission of India and 
others.40 
                                                 
36
 It may be argued that India’s secondary diffusion strategies of emulation and regulatory 
competition further bolster the authority of the competition law as both represent tradition and 
charisma to the extent that they suggest a strong connection between the competition law 
and international best practices in respect of competition laws. 
37
 Writ Petition No. 1785 of 2009, instituted before the Bombay High Court. Decided on 31
st
 
March 2010. 
38
 WP No. 358 of 2010, instituted before the Bombay High Court. Decided on 18th August 
2010.  
39
 WP No. 6805 of 2010 filed before the Delhi High Court. Decided on 6th October 2010.  
40 
WP No. 7766 of 2010 filed before the Delhi High Court. Decided on 23.11.2010. 
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Gujarat Guardian Limited had challenged the jurisdiction of the 
Commission on the basis that the case had been initiated by the 
Monopoly Control Authority. In this case as in (c) above, the High Court 
allowed the Commission to proceed with the matter.  
 
Two points may be noted in respect of the challenges brought against the 
competition law and the response of the General Courts in respect of these 
challenges: First, that the challenges were limited to the manner in which the 
Commission could exercise its powers rather than on questioning its 
fundamental legality and secondly, that the General Courts decided these 
clearly, in favour of the Commission and within a reasonable time. Both these 
points may plausibly (if not exclusively) be linked to the diffusion strategy 
followed by India in acquiring the competition law and the impact of the 
strategy on the legitimacy of the law.  
 
The fact that the challenges brought before the General Courts were few to 
begin with and remained restricted only to certain aspects of the operation of 
the Commission may in significant part be explained by fact that the strategy 
of socialization had created a sufficiently strong perception of the legality and 
authority of the competition law. The logic in this observation becomes more 
evident when the Indian situation is compared with that of Pakistan which had 
primarily employed the strategies of contractualization and coercion in 
acquiring its competition law: Not only were the challenges filed against the 
competition law before the General Courts in Pakistan far greater in number 
but also raised a greater variety of grounds including grounds challenging the 
very fundamental constitutionality of the competition law, the existence of the 
Pakistani Commission and the validity of its actions. The further fact that the 
General Courts in India decided these matters clearly, in favour of the 
Commission and speedily and thereby settled certain basic concerns 
regarding the legality of the Commission’s actions may also, at least in part, 
be attributed to the strategy of socialization followed in India. Specifically, it 
may be argued that strategy of socialization had contributed to creating 
greater awareness of the legality and authority of the competition law amongst 
the legal community and the judiciary. Whilst these and similar decisions of 
General Courts in India do not mean that aggrieved parties do not and will not 
continue to lodge appeals against decisions of the Commission before the 
COMPAT (or from the decisions of the COMPAT, before the Supreme Court 
of India), it does mean that the indirect impact of the diffusion strategy 
adopted by India is likely to be aligned with and supportive of its direct impact 
and that the implementation trajectory will be charted in the manner 
envisaged by the government at the time of enacting the competition law.  
 
Once again, the situation of competition law in India becomes clearer when 
contrasted with that in Pakistan. Not only are the challenges against 
competition law brought before the General Courts in Pakistan far greater in 
number but also they call into question the fundamental constitutional legality 
of the competition law. Further, the response of the General Courts in 
Pakistan to these challenges has been lukewarm, at best. The General Courts 
in Pakistan had stayed the operation of the Commission in most of the cases 
brought before them and at the time of writing this paper, had not finally 
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decided any of the challenges. Although the response of the Pakistani 
General Courts in respect of competition matters may, in part, be explained by 
the problem of endemic delay prevalent in the Pakistani legal system. 
However, given that delay is a problem in the Indian legal system as much as 
it is in the Pakistani legal system, it may also partially be attributed to the 
reluctance of the Pakistani General Courts to grapple with issues that by 
rights should have been settled at the time the law was first enacted or even 
re-enacted, perhaps because the strategy of contractualization and coercion 
adopted by Pakistan had failed to create a broad based understanding and 
therefore of acceptance of the law. In this way, it may observed that the 
indirect impact of the diffusion strategy of contractualization and coercion 
followed in Pakistan is at odds with its direct impact to the extent that it 
interferes with the smooth and stable operation of the Commission.  
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
The trajectory along which competition law has been implemented in India to 
date is determined as much by the strategy and process through which the 
country acquired its competition law as it is by the substance of the law itself. 
Diffusion theory provides the necessary framework for unraveling the manner 
in which India’s strategy for adopting and adapting the competition law 
impacts the operation of the Implementing Institutions and thereby the 
implementation trajectory of the competition law in the country. In particular, 
an examination of India’s diffusion strategy for acquiring its competition law, 
particularly when compared with the strategy adopted by its neighbor Pakistan 
in this regard, suggests that India’s dominant diffusion strategy of socialization 
has played a distinct and recognizable role in shaping the structure, mandate 
and composition of the Implementing Institutions, particularly that of the 
Commission. The impact of the diffusion strategy on the structure, mandate 
and composition of the Implementing Institutions has, in turn, directly 
impacted the decision-making of the Implementing Institutions (especially the 
Commission). India’s strategy of socialization has also had a recognizable, 
positive impact on the legitimacy of the competition law in the country. It is in 
significant part due to India’s diffusion strategy that General Courts have had 
little or no hesitation on endorsing the operation of the Commission. It may, 
therefore, be concluded that when a country like India which has a strong 
tradition of democracy and the institutions to support it, adopts a strategy of 
socialization for adopting a law such as the competition law, and thereby 
includes its major institutions in deliberating and defining the specifications of 
the law, the direct and indirect impact of the strategy are aligned with and 
supportive or each other. This further suggests that a strategy of socialization 
is likely to allow the adopted law to proceed more smoothly and without major 
hindrances, along the lines envisaged by the law itself.  
 
